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Farmville, Eternal Recurrence,  
and the Will-to-Power-Ups
Dylan Wittkower 
NWW.IV, April 13, 2013
Was heißt Gamification? That is: what is called gamifica-
tion? — but also, what calls upon us to gamify? What is it, in 
our age, that is such that gamification should emerge within it, 
should be called forth by it?
I hope, most centrally, to ask the last of these questions, but 
the way we build in our questioning cannot but pass through the 
other questions as well. Still, since this last concern is my focus, 
we will begin with Heidegger’s use of Nietz sche in his attempt to 
understand our technological age, in which we are called upon 
to gamify.
1. Heidegger’s View of Nietz schean Eternal Recurrence 
In Lecture X of Was Heißt Denken?, Heidegger claims that 
eternal recurrence, encapsulated in Will to Power §617 (“That 
everything recurs is the closest approximation of a world of 
Becoming to the world of Being”1), remains “wrapped in thick 
clouds” not due to “any inability in Nietz sche’s own thinking,” 
1 Friedrich Nietz sche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. 
Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), 330.
209
farmville, eternal recurrence, and the will-to-power-ups
but because “it is the matter itself which is named by the term 
‘the eternal recurrence of the same’ that is wrapped in a dark-
ness from which even Nietz sche had to shrink back in terror.”2 
He goes on to caution us not to dismiss eternal recurrence as “a 
mystical fantasy,” commenting that “the coming age, in which 
the essence of modern technology — the steadily rotating recur-
rence of the same — will come to light, might have taught man 
that a thinker’s essential thoughts do not become in any way less 
true simply because we fail to think them.”3 
Eternal recurrence, then, is shrouded in darkness because it is 
a kind of expression or reflection of the essence of modern tech-
nology, which Heidegger would elsewhere call “Enframing.”4 To 
reinforce this connection, we might note the parallel between 
Heidegger’s phrase in these passages, “the steadily rotating re-
currence of the same [die ständig rotierende Wiederkehr des 
Gleichen],” and Nietz sche’s phrase, “the eternal recurrence of 
the same [der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen].” This is no il-
lusion of translation! We see also, in “Who is Nietz sche’s Zara-
thustra,” where Heidegger again warns us not to think of eternal 
recurrence as “a mystic phantasmagoria,” a further comment 
that “a look at the present age might well teach us a different 
lesson — presupposing of course that thinking is called upon to 
bring to light the essence of modern technology,” followed by 
the rhetorical question, “what else is the essence of the modern 
power-driven machine than one offshoot of the eternal recur-
rence of the same?”5  
The difference, then, between eternal recurrence and the 
darkness of the steadily rotating recurrence, corresponds to 
the transformative and nihilistic responses to “the greatest 
weight” — that is, the gap between “[e]verything recurs, it de-
2 Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, trans. John Gray and Fred 
Weick (New York: Harper and Row, 2004), 108. 
3 Ibid., 109. 
4 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 
trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977). 
5 Martin Heidegger, Nietz sche: Volumes I & II, trans. David Farrell Krell (San 
Francisco: Harper, 1991), 233. 
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pends on each moment, everything matters — it is all alike,” and 
“[e]verything is naught, indifferent, so that nothing is worth-
while — it is all alike.”6 Nihilism, however — exemplified by the 
last man, who says “we have achieved happiness” and blinks — is 
not easily marked by awareness of nihilism but (as in “the dan-
ger”) may be accompanied by a lack of awareness that there are 
alternate, life-affirming forms of valuation, valuation which is 
true to the earth.
What could be a more perfect, complete, and literal version 
of this steadily rotating recurrence, this nihilism that does not 
know it is a nihilism, than gamification? 
Consider the closed system of Farmville in which clicks plant 
fictional seeds upon which we must wait to harvest fictional 
crops to get coins so that we can continue to click and to buy 
decorations to give us something to look at while we cycle from 
clicking to waiting captured in a circuit of drive7 to play out 
capitalist accumulation serving nothing but the exchange of real 
time and money for fictional time and money — and in which 
the “fiction” has little in the way of story, characters, or other 
compelling elements of fiction! 
Consider the economies of World of Warcraft, in which we 
grind and level, paying for the ability to toil alongside Chinese 
gold farmers in offline sweatshops. 
Is this not hatred of the earth in practice if not in thought? 
2. Gamification: A Post-Nietz schean Definition
For further analysis, we need some discussion of definitions and 
examples of gamification. But this is itself fraught with difficulties! 
Gamification is an ill-defined process. Those things that charac-
terize games need not be present in the gamified — for example, 
that games are fun, at least in principle — and even games can be 
gamified, as in fantasy football, or in the simple case of betting. 
6 Ibid., 182. 
7 Jodi Dean, Blog Theory (Malden: Polity Press, 2010). 
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Gamification, like the term “game” itself,8 is likely a family-resem-
blance term. How then shall we define it in a manner sufficient to 
ask what, in our age, calls gamification forth?
A merely descriptive definition may not get us to the heart 
of the matter, given the family-resemblance use of the term, and 
so we will begin from a core starting point, and then put forth 
a prescriptively-oriented definition. This will allow us to iden-
tify forms of gamification not commonly discussed as such, and 
to discard false positives as well. And where better to turn for a 
starting point than to business research on effective gamification?
In her article “Seven Examples: Put Gamification to Work,” 
Debra Donston-Miller draws upon a definition from Gartner 
Research Inc., where gamification is characterized by: 
1. Accelerated feedback cycles: Gamification increases the ve-
locity of feedback loops to maintain engagement.
2. Clear goals and rules of play: Gamification provides clear 
goals and well-defined rules of play to ensure players feel 
empowered to achieve goals.
3. A compelling narrative: Gamification builds a narrative that 
engages players to participate and achieve the goals of the 
activity.
4. Tasks that are challenging but achievable: Gamification pro-
vides many short-term, achievable goals to maintain engage-
ment. 
A prescriptive definition departing from this might then be that 
gamification is a kind of exploit9 of fundamental intra- and in-
terpersonal drives, to achieve effects external and accidentally 
related to the natural outcomes of their means,10 thereby con-
8 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. Gertrude Ans-
combe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 32, §67. 
9 Alexander Galloway and Eugene Thacker, The Exploit: A Theory of Networks 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007). 
10 Rather than true ends, which are consummatory fulfillments of their means 




stituting, rather than a “magic circle,”11 a simulacral realm12 of 
false needs13 which may or may not coincide with the realiza-
tion of true needs. Accelerated feedback cycles hack into circuits 
of drive established originally with relation to actual life goals 
within personal narratives, displacing our will to power from 
the world into a safer, more empowering, more predictable, 
more structured false world — compelling, clear, challenging, 
rewarding, and tidy.
This definition should be sufficient to apply to a variety of 
clear cases of gamification, and to identify the structure of gami-
fication in systems not normally described as “gamified.” The 
MMORPG presents us with a clear case, as do social games, such 
as Farmville — with social games presenting a more unalloyed 
form of the gamified game, since, unlike MMORPGs, they do not 
contain structures that lead easily to actual robust interaction 
between players and friends. 
As Bogost demonstrated in his Cow Clicker reductio,14 the 
fundamental structure at work in many social games is one in 
which each action is valorized by its enabling of further actions 
within the closed system, and the sheer fact of delay, coupled 
with arbitrary and isolated, in-world valorized reward struc-
tures, is sufficient to generate the exploit of our psychological 
reward structures. This simulacral growth and progress is often 
enough accompanied by a simulacral sociality, as Losh dem-
onstrated in her analysis of the antisociality of “social games,”15 
whether friends appear as assets as in Mafia Wars, in leader-
boards as in the iOS Game Center, or as nominal interactants 
as in Farmville. In social games, just as play is reduced to the 
11 Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture (Bos-
ton: Beacon Press, 1955). 
12 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. Mark Poster (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1994). 
13 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, trans. Douglas Kellner (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1964). 
14 Ian Bogost, “Cow Clicker: The Making of Obsession,” July 21, 2010, http://
www.bogost.com/blog/cow_clicker_1.shtml.
15 Elizabeth Losh, “With Friends Like These, Who Needs Enemies?,” in Face-
book and Philosophy, ed. Dylan Wittkower (Chicago: Open Court, 2010). 
213
farmville, eternal recurrence, and the will-to-power-ups
mere disconnected simulacral image of the ludic, sociality is 
reduced to its mere disconnected simulacral image of sociality 
as well — we “play” in the mode of machine operators, as we 
“interact” with “friends” in the mode of network administrators. 
In this kind of “whatever” gaming,16 content, story, gameworld, 
and fellow players are reduced to mere moving parts to be ma-
nipulated; intensity, degree, and function rather than content, 
meaning, or enjoyment. We play Candy Crush Saga in a mode of 
disguised self-hatred even as we continue to play it, a “regressive 
gaming” parallel to the “regressive listening […] always ready to 
degenerate into rage” that Adorno described in relation to fash-
ionable jazzed-up music17 — we know it to be false and empty 
even as we cannot but be captured in its orbit.
But of course it is not only games which are gamified. Con-
sider badging, barnstars, and Employees of the Month. Consider 
the similar drives in the schoolchild’s fundraiser sales of choco-
late bars, in which points are earned and trinkets given. Consid-
er the elevation of couponing into a robust life practice in which 
“savings” — the shadow-world capital accumulation of merely 
counterfactual exchange values — are accumulated, producing 
as a secondary effect the piling-up of less-than-freely chosen 
consumer goods, which then need to be consumed in order to 
valorize the counterfactual shadow-wealth accumulated in their 
purchase. Consider No Child Left Behind, under which we have 
codified the movement in educational practice wherein learn-
ing and understanding are pursued in schools only in so far as 
they can be adequately captured within empirical and standard-
ized assessments in regular feedback cycles — the crudest form 
of logical positivism, but applied not to metaphysics but instead 
to human growth and the enlightenment ideal.
In the broadest sense: Consider “saving time” and the cult of 
busyness. We have exported the corporate and capitalist con-
16 After Jodi Dean’s “whatever blogging” (Blog Theory). 
17 Theodor Adorno, “On the Fetish Character in Music and the Regression of 




cerns with cost-saving measures into our existential engage-
ment — just as businesses seek to minimize capital outlay in 
the conduct of business, so too do we seek constantly to reduce 
time spent on both necessary and voluntary tasks. In business, 
the capital accumulated in this manner can be used to expand 
the business or can be treated as simple profits made. In our 
lives, however, time “saved” cannot be accumulated, and we 
cannot expand into additional lives or acquire other persons 
through hostile take-overs. Instead, time “saved” will automati-
cally dissipate — will be “wasted,” as it seems we cannot avoid 
thinking — unless it is “spent.” Just as the machines must be kept 
running in order to maximize the profitability of constant capi-
tal — as Marx said, the factory left idle at night could be just as 
easily used during that time to gain further surplus value from 
variable capital18 — we must keep ourselves running at full tilt, 
lest the sacrifices we have made to quality of life in order to ac-
cumulate the counterfactual time we have “saved” should go to 
“waste.”
In this way, we see a logic of gamification at work in our most 
basic Enframing: we valorize our life through its ordering as 
standing-reserve, which ordering has value through its expendi-
ture — but this expenditure must itself be productive, and we 
have little notion left of productivity other than the generation 
of further standing-reserve. When we fall under the sway of the 
cult of busyness, we live in the constant sacrifice of the quality 
of the present in the service of maximizing the quantity of the 
future. The system holds together only through the ideological 
projection of another form of valuation: “quality time” — as if 
other time is to be without quality!; is it then merely quantity 
time? Surely this would fit well enough with Heidegger’s notion 
of “calculative thought,”19 and this is the mode in which we think 
18 Karl Marx, Capital, Volume One, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1887), http://www.marxists.org/archive/
marx/works/download/pdf/Capital-Volume-I.pdf. 
19 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. Hans Freund and John An-
derson (New York: Harper & Row, 1966). 
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of ourselves as a set of time-resources to be responsibly allo-
cated.
What could be a clearer nihilism than the reduction of our 
own self-regard to merely quantitative valuation? What could 
be a greater form of hatred of the earth? Here, we devalue life 
not in order to sacrifice it to another life to follow, and we treat 
this world as false not by comparison to some true noumenal 
or post-mortem world, but instead treat it as a false version of 
nothing more than itself. The True World? Perhaps we have 
abolished it, but the world in which we live remains to us mostly 
an illusion; a series of mere passings-through en route to catch 
the will-o’-the-wisp of the True World: Quality Time, Hobbies, 
and Retirement.
Thankfully, we are not so foolish as to actually live by our 
rhetoric. Although we have difficulty avoiding viewing ourselves 
as standing-reserve and falling into a gamification of life, we of-
ten enough cannot but take pleasure in the world. We may speak 
of going to the gym in mechanistic terms of creating health, and 
our minds may disappear into televisions while on the machines 
so that the time can be “spent” in the body’s self-manufacturing 
without our having to be present for the whole tedious affair, 
but we still take pleasure both in the strengthening of our bod-
ies and in the ache of overworked muscles. We keep at our tasks 
and seek efficiency as if an intrinsic good, but we still enjoy our 
distractions and find we have somehow “made” time (out of 
what?) for hallway conversations and extra afternoon cups of 
coffee. 
3. Towards a Gamification That Is True to the Earth
But through the danger, the saving power also grows. If the dan-
ger is that Enframing should crowd out all other modes of the 
revealing of Being, and if gamification is a sort of Enframing, 
then what, in the spread of gamification, can we identify as a 
new Clearing? In what ways can gamification stay true to the 
earth, reveal to us forms of value which lead us away from the 
nihilism of closed systems of in-game reward structures back to 
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true needs and a real world? Let’s look at some cases that may 
indicate a pathway.
Consider the Toyota Prius dashboard display. It gives us a 
fast cycle of change and reward, training us to think effectively 
about MPG rates as we drive. This structure hooks up directly to 
a set of concerns that motivate us to engage in this gamification, 
and the reward structures correspond to actual effects realized 
through the gamified set of actions. The skills and habits gener-
ated through this practice are, furthermore, transferable — those 
value-motivated practices trained through gamification can be 
utilized with other vehicles, and can become part of our habits 
such that we can continue to realize those goals through our 
activity when we are not paying attention to the display, but are 
instead listening to music, speaking with passengers, or simply 
engaged in driving itself.
Consider Zombies, Run! — an iPhone ARG (alternate reality 
game), Zombies, Run! creates an audio environmental overlay in 
which the long-term reward structures of running are replaced 
by a fast cycle of danger and achievement, through simulating 
a pack of zombies whose moans and shuffling come ever closer. 
We choose to enter its gamified environment in order to pro-
vide a proxy set of motivations for an activity towards which we 
have a second-order desire:20 we do not wish to run, but we wish 
that we did wish to do so, and through this second-order desire 
choose to supplant our first-order desires with those brought 
upon us within the game world. The effects achieved are not iso-
lated to the game world, but also produce desired real-world ef-
fects, and do so in a way which generates independence from the 
game-world: as we run more, and as we run more more often, 
we train and reconstitute our bodies into those which are more 
well-fitted to the first-order desires we wished we had initially. A 
non-runner who acquires something closer to a runner’s body 
and a runner’s habits is more likely to become a runner. 
20 Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and The Concept of a Person,” The 
Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 5–20. 
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Consider Superbetter. Through the use of rapid cycling re-
wards corresponding to real world behaviors, activities of health 
and recovery can be given proxy motivations, as in the previous 
case, and can result in new and transferable habits and behav-
ior, as in the first case. By folding in social networks in a robust 
and interactive way, the gamified sociality of social games is 
also brought in, but is brought in in a way which generates real 
bonds and support networks, by asking users to actually cor-
respond with and create meaningful connections with friends 
designated as supporters in their processes of health and recov-
ery.
Through these examples, we can begin to generate a prin-
ciple of gamification that remains true to the earth. Gamifica-
tion creates a system of false needs and rewards short-circuiting 
the will to power, capturing it in the will to power-up. This can 
be life-affirming when 1) actions result in outcomes that escape 
recapture, that extend beyond the game system; when 2) those 
actions are adopted by players as a reason for play; and when 3) 
due to the game-exterior connection, a natural end is reached, 
allowing intrinsic reward structures to properly motivated de-
sired game-exterior activity. Or — perhaps — when the game is, 
in fact, fun.
